



Supervisor: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau  
Section Chief: Chief of the 1st Section, American Affairs Bureau  
Drafted: 5 Nov. 1941  
Telegram: Despatch No. 42026  
To: Ambassador NO. U.S.A. in the U.S.A.  
From: /Foreign/ Minister TOGO  
Subject: Japanese American Negotiations  
726 (in cipher Code of Office Read.  
of utmost secrecy)

As to the present negotiations, it is necessary that the signing should be completed by the 25th of this month at the latest, because of various circumstances. Althoug' this would seem to be compelling you to accomplish a matter of utmost difficulty, it is absolutely unavoidable under all the circumstances. Therefore, we beg of you to understand the above thoroughly and with the great resolution of saving the Japanese American negotiations from failure, to exert yourself to the utmost.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Exhibit No

I.P.S. Doc. No. 1532

Item 76

次  
大  
花  
臣  
押

電送第42873-42875号	支那事務官事務長官照相十六年十一月三十日
昭和十六年十一月三十日	支那事務官事務長官照相十六年十一月三十日
件名	宛
日本 英皇	在米
大日本 公使	大使
第七六四号	兎東御大臣
一館長	符

一十一月廿四日、本邦政府在モロッコ英米大使官邸にて、  
一、貴大臣、内閣總理大臣、外相、内相、内閣官房長官、外務省長官、  
告セル。又、政府より、英國政府ニ報。英國政府ハ、革府ニ於ケル詰合、詳  
細ニ承知スルモノ、功ハ日英、利益ナニ依リ之ヲ趣  
望スル事、ニ、属州山地付キ何等カ、討議ノ基礎ナ  
先以テ成。又、サレハ、通ニ、交渉ニ入ル、必要ヲ認、人其  
間、詰合ハ、英國ニ付ニ至セ、差支ナシト考ヘ居リ  
尤モ現実、ナシ得。又、米國政府ハ、直ニ英國政  
府ト、協議、コト、ナリ。居ルニ付キ其際、ハ、日米政府ト共  
ニ、共通開港、解消ニ付キ、其際ハ、日米政府ト共  
越セリ。其ハ、タク  
六、依テ本ハ、日本、米交渉中、英國ニ重大利害開  
保ル事、ナリ。又、日米開合意成立、降ハ、之ト同時  
ニ、英國開港、中項、ナリ。日英間ニ合意成立シ、同時  
調印、保ヒト吉、ナリ。要ナリ。以テ、米國政府一封



最大限譲歩ヲ敢テシタル最後案ヲ提示セシ次第ニテ本側ニモ多分此上、反対ナカレハシト思ヒ居ル處米國政府ヲ右ラ受諾セハ一周間乃至十日以内ニ調印可能ナルヘ、又不幸ニテ之ヲ拒否セハ交渉繼續、可能性ナキ誤合ナリ。我國内情勢ハ寔ニ比上、遷延ヲ絶対ニ許サス。本大臣ハ日英、日米關係、危局ヲ回避スル爲目下畢生、努力カラ傾注、居ルモノニニテ國內一部ニハ交渉無用論サヘアリシ拘ラス之ヲ制シテ交渉繼續、決定セシムルル經緯アリ。從ワテ比上、交渉ヲ遷延セシムルヲハ不可能ニニ且無意味、結果トナレハ、更本態度如何ニ依リテハ迅速妥結、方法モアル次第ナレハ貴國政府、於テ干此辺、事情ヲ充分ニ考量シ交渉急速成立ニ盡力アリ度。ト述ニテ事態眞逼迫セラ、痛感セルモノ如右、早速政府ニ電報スヘ、自分モ局面打開ノ爲最善、努力カラ、式ミルヘント一、  
述ヘ辭去セリ。

三右、如ナ米國政府ハ今猶英國政府ニ對シ、今次交渉ハ未タ  
了備的意見交換、或コ出テサルモ、十人ヤニ説明シ居ルモノト認  
メラルル處右ハ（貴電第一〇セリ号）ローズベルト大統領、言  
(本件了備、会談力交渉、基礎タル（キ良好、結果ヲ擧テシテ  
ア希望ス云々）ニ微スモ明白ニシテ、交渉既ニ最後的段階ニ至事態  
逐日緊迫コ加ヘワツアリ。現在本國政府カ依然トニテ斯、候長  
緩慢ナ、態度ヲ持スル、少ニトシテ頗レ意外且遺憾トス。所ナ  
リ就テハ貴大使ハ屢次訓令、趣旨ヲ体レ更ニ未側召喚蒙、其  
猶省ヲ促シテ、二本件妥結ニ意ヲ決セシムル様、尙奮闘アラシコト

Loc. No. 1532 - Item 76

Exh. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Superintendent: American Bureau Chief Sendi YAMAMOTO

Official in charge: Chief of 1st Section, American Bureau SHUN

Drafted on 11 Nov. 1941

Electrical Transmission No. 42873-42875

Sent at 1: A.M., 12 Nov. 1941

To: Ambassador NOMURA in the United States of America

From: Minister TOGO

Subject: Japanese-American Negotiations

(A conversation with the British Ambassador)

(Code) Very Urgent No. 764 (Diplomatic Agency Code)

(T.N. on the margin) Minister      Signed      Telegraph Section Chief  
Vice-Minister      Signed      (KAMEYAMA)

1. The British ambassador in Tokyo called on the 11th on some other business stating that he had reported the words of Your Excellency the Minister (sic) /TN. Ambassador's?/ (previous telegram No. 732-2) to his home Government, to which his government sent word to the following effect: - "The British Government knows no details of the conversations carried on in Washington, but eagerly desires for the success in them as it will be advantageous to Japan and Great Britain.

Unless some or other bases of discussion, however, for the establishment of principles are formulated first, it is regarded as unnecessary to enter into further negotiations. It is of an opinion that the intervention of consultation can be left to the U. S. Government. When actual negotiations are possible, however, the U.S. Government is by arrangement to confer with the British Government; so in that case it will be glad to cooperate with Japan and the United States for the settlement of common problems."

2. Then, I, the Minister, stated: - "As the Japanese-American negotiations contain matters of great interest to Great Britain it will be necessary for Japan and Great Britain to arrive at an agreement and sign it simultaneously when an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, and I have desired the U.S. Government to make such arrangements." The said Ambassador replied that he did not know the real state of the Japanese-American

negotiations, but that he understood that they were still in the stage of preparatory conversations. I, the Minister, said: - "Whatever may be the case in the past, the negotiations have now become formal negotiations in the very light of their substance. They have already entered into the final stage with the submission of the final counter-proposal of the Imperial Government. To this effect, I made a statement to the U. S. the other day. The British Premier, in his speech at the luncheon given by the Lord Mayor of London, said that he was going to send a warning to Japan though he was not well acquainted with the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations. But would it not be more appropriate for Great Britain to know all the details of such important negotiations and to cooperate in them than to issue a warning? I have no intention of making any special proposal as to Great Britain's participation in the Japanese-American negotiations in the present stage, there being / certain/ relations between Great Britain and the United States. The Imperial Government has daringly submitted its last proposal with greatest concessions for the sake of a rapid conclusion of the negotiations, and so it is thought that there will be no further objection by U.S.; if the U.S. Government accepts it, it can be signed within a week or ten days; and if, unfortunately, it is rejected, there will be no possibility of continuing the negotiations. Our domestic situation positively admits of no further delay of the negotiations. I, the Minister, am now doing my utmost to avoid the crisis between Japan and Great Britain and between Japan and the United States. In certain quarters in the country the uselessness of the negotiations was insisted upon, but this was suppressed and caused the continuation of the negotiations to be decided upon; in view of the said circumstances it will be impossible and end in a meaningless result to delay the negotiations any further. As a quick conclusion is possible depending upon the attitudes of Great Britain and the United States, I desire the British Government to take those circumstances into consideration and to make efforts for quick conclusion of the negotiations."

When I thus dwelt upon the urgency of the situation, the said Ambassador, after listening, seemed to be deeply impressed for the first time by the real urgency of the situation, said that he would despatch a report to his Government to that effect and do his best to save the situation.

3. As mentioned above, it is understood that the U. S. Government is describing to the British Government that the present negotiations to be supposedly still on the stage of preparatory exchange of opinions, and this is clarified in President Roosevelt's Words (2-1 your telegram No. 1070) (It is desired that these preparatory conversations will have good results as a basis of negotiations, etc.) We are very surprised and regret

That the U. S. Government is assuming such an easy-going and slow attitude when the negotiations are now in the final stage and the situation is growing more and more urgent each day. It is earnestly desired that Your Excellency the Ambassador make efforts to further enlighten the U.S. in accordance with my frequent instructions and urge them to make serious reconsideration so as to induce them into deciding upon the conclusion of these negotiations. 2-2

Exhibit No

野村大便 恒松館長等流 落木外語社社長  
一九〇九年十一月廿四日於日本  
本體會事會長 河合宣三會長 日本文部省  
次官金澤信最後信件取下 舊人會  
臺灣天命待之心懷不然 諸事下情參行  
近頃觀測天體報告由外國政府 大半由政府日本  
主導而追此進之體會在而事經清臣道  
其目的 事成于大毛戰爭而此處為一者

即今日午後南進奉化之北，會計計，作戰甚，他  
方縱橫備，厚以肉搏，上相抗，勝負未可測。來國，信  
條之政治的根本原則，詳報參議院，定於華日，  
爭之，亦竟悟，今所失敗，不可謂非抑，抑非  
又數年，可謂之公私，如半身不遂，及不竟思  
天下，則公私殊無以堪也。惟念今茲，時已暮矣，  
上以謂，萬事，戰事，公私，念如現在，寧猶諱和，危  
險，亦薄，事之最，好，之，不，會，日，一，層，此，也，不，以  
上，曰，料，不，此。

六、此戰爭長期，其父兄，勢三三局，得部，成敗，在程大內題，立委最後追水，張，夕也，力勝為夕心，不毛雲壤，想，三，夕也，力，夕，大西洋，深入，夕也，夕，言。

P.S. Doc. No. 1532

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IPS POC. NO. 1532  
Item 91

Exh. No. \_\_\_\_\_

/Marginal Remarks:/

Minister: O.K.

This telegram is not to be handled to anyone but the Minister. P.T.N.  
written in red pencil./

#34948  
(General: #34925 )  
#34947

Chief of the Telegraph Section: (KAMEYAMA) /seal/

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Despatched from Washington: P.M., Nov. 14 1941.  
(Secret)

Received by this Ministry: A.M., Nov. 15.

/TOP SECRET Cipher Code of Office Head/

/From:/ Ambassador NCMURA

/To:/ Foreign Minister LOGG

No. 1090

This telegram is for your Excellency's own information only.

As regards the Japanese-American negotiations, I will exert my efforts to the last with firm conviction that they will surely reach an agreement. After my efforts I will leave the rest to Providence --- this is my frame of mind. My observation of the current situation, however, is as follows:

1. As I have repeatedly informed you, the Pacific policy of the American Government is to check further advances by Japan either southward or northward; and though they /the American Government/ are attempting to achieve this objective through economic oppression, they are making steady preparations for war.
2. In other words, they are making operational and all other preparations in case Japan should make her southward or northward advance; they are co-operating with the nations concerned with utmost efforts; and rather than stretch their fundamental political principle in which they have believed and compromised, they would not hesitate to fight. It does not seem at present that they have any intention to repeat such as the Munich Conference held a few years ago and branded as a failure; this seems still more so, now that Germany has passed

the crest of her prosperity, they are pleased with the fact that the Soviet Union has still the will to fight and accordingly the fear of her making a separate peace has been diminished.

3. Their relations with China have been turning day by day to those of allied powers and they are giving assistance as far as circumstances may permit. And it seems that they are not in a position to acknowledge such conditions as will produce an unfavorable effect upon the sovereignty of China for the purpose of stabilizing the Pacific. Therefore, the China problem may prove to be a stumbling block in the way of the stabilization of the Pacific and due to this, the adjustment of Japanese-American relations may also become impossible.
4. The relations with the Axis powers are very flexible and it rests with the authorities of the Japanese Government whether they become very closely united into one body or otherwise. Nevertheless, they consider that in effect, /we/ are in a position to immediately attack America in the rear, if the situation required. The newspapers are gradually in a tone of writing of our closer relationship with the Axis, or, in some extreme cases, the unification with them.
5. Should our country venture a southward advance for the sake of self-existence and self-support, it naturally follows that there will be a war with Britain, America, and the Netherlands, and besides, I believe, chances are great for the Soviet Union's participating in it. Furthermore, among neutral nations, those in Central America have already been got under America's thumb; and as for those in South America, for their economic existence, they will after all, reluctantly maintain neutrality, which is advantageous to the American side.
6. It is inevitable that this war will extend over a long period, and local success or failure will matter little. It is not hard to see that whoever holds out to the last will be the victor.
7. Indeed, America seems to be going deeper and deeper into the Atlantic, but/what it does/ in that area is, in brief, merely an operation relating to 'convoys' and, as things stand now, it will be able to concentrate its main force to the Pacific at any moment. In the light of the current conditions of the German and the Italian Navy, Great Britain also must be able to despatch a considerable strength to the area of the Indian Ocean. Really I had expected that

should America be kept busy on the Atlantic, it would come to assume somewhat conciliatory attitude in the Pacific, but no such inclination is seen as yet. On the contrary, in the light of the fact that there are still some to oppose war with Germany because of domestic problems, and that on the other hand, no opposition to the Pacific war is found at present in the public opinion, it is necessary to expect that it is quite probable for America to participate into war in this area.

8. I shall be open to the criticism of being reckless to suggest this, when I realize from your successive telegrams that the situation is pressing though I am not well informed on the state of the current domestic affairs, and when I am informed to the effect that the nation are in the point of exhausting their patience, it is my humble opinion, however, that we had better be patient till we can see a little more clearly through the whole situation of the world war, if the state of affairs in our country permits, rather than be particular about the speediness of a month or two.

Furthermore, I should like to ask you to read my telegram of the 3rd and the 4th of October, No. 894 and No. 901.

(The end)

Exhibit No

1947 C.P.S. Doc No. 1532 Jan 10th

Supervisor: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau  
Section Chief: Chief of the 1st Section, American Affairs Bureau  
Drafted: 15 Nov. 1941  
Telegram Sent: At 4:13 pm on 16 Nov. 1941  
From: Minister TOJO  
To: Ambassador NORIYA  
#781 (B) Very Urgent (Ambassador's code)  
Subject: Japanese-American Negotiations

1. I am in receipt of yr telegram #1090. Your anxieties and efforts are greatly appreciated but since the fate of the nation will become tense within a wee', further efforts on your part are urgently requested.
2. The import of the letter part of your telegram is quite understandable and we have given it due consideration and discussed it carefully before decision was made on the fundamental national policy as per our telegram #725. However, I regret that it is impossible for us, due to various circumstances, to wait patiently until some idea can be formed as to the outlook of the world war, as you suggest. I hope you will realize that the necessity for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations by the date set in our telegram #726 absolutely cannot be changed. Accordingly, as there are very few days left, please do your best to urge them on and lead the negotiations towards conclusion, on the basis of the Japanese proposals, not letting the Americans go into many directions.

中華書局影印  
中華書局影印

(Please handle this telegram with care)

Supervisor: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau

Section Chief: Chief of the 1st Section

Drafted: Nov. 22, 1941

Dispatched: November 22, 1941 - 1:10 p.m.

To: Ambassador NOLUHA

From: /Foreign Minister TOGO

Re: Japanese-American Negotiations

(Cipher Code Telegram) #812 (Cipher Code for Office Read)

To both Ambassadors

As you know, it is almost impossible to change the date set in the outgoing Telegram #736. However, since you are working hard, and as the Imperial Government, without discarding the fixed policy, wishes to spare no efforts to save the situation by reasoning to the last and thereby prevent the breaking-up of the Japanese-American relations, we have decided though there has been difficulties beyond your conception, to wait until the 29th, if an understanding between Japan and the U.S.A. can be reached within the next 3 or 4 days and the signing can be completed by that date, as well as the exchange of official notes, etc., and through which a firm agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands be made and all procedures completed. The said date cannot absolutely be changed further and the situations thereafter will have to develop automatically. Please take the above circumstances into consideration and do your utmost for the completion of the negotiations.

This is strictly for the two Ambassadors alone.

Seen by: Minister  
Vice Minister

Seen by: Chief of the American Affairs Bureau  
Chief of the South Seas Affairs Bureau

(Gen. 36293) To: Foreign Minister TOGO

From: Ambassador YOSHIZAWA

Despatched: 25 November 1941 PM Hanoi

Received: 26 November 1941 AM Foreign Office

Secret Ambassador's Code

Telegram No. 118 (Secret)

From what we have heard from the military, it seems that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt a decision between peace and war will be made at the Imperial Conference /BYOGI/ to be held within a day or two. If the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall of course be successively launched in accordance with the plans which have already been laid down.

However, should the negotiations fail, our forces will probably advance within ten days since practically all preparations for the campaign are already nearing completion.

Under these circumstances, there shall have to be considerable alterations in the program for the various enterprises to be carried out in accordance with our previous policy. We shall have to establish organs and conduct negotiations in compliance with the campaign. And especially, the thing that we are most concerned about is whether it is the policy of the government or the Imperial Headquarters, in the event of war, to proceed with military operations maintaining the status quo of the French-Indo-China government, and not only is it essential that we be previously informed of the above, but we wish to make necessary preparations at an early date. Therefore, if you have any opinions on the development of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations and on the outlook of the aforementioned matter, please wire us your instructions as soon as possible.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance, but according to press reports, the United States in conferring with the representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands, and China in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are aware of the matters being discussed in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Moreover, by means of personnel commuting to and

from Tokyo, the military here are also aware of not only the substance of the Japanese instructions but also the particulars of the said negotiations.

We feel as if the Foreign Office organ alone have been left out and neglected. As you pointed out in your circular message No. 2353, the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Therefore, please make arrangements to advise us immediately on these points by means of cable or courier services.

(End)

Exhibit No.

9 P.S. Doc. No. 1532

June 163  
(1936293)

高祖之子，皆爲侯王。及惠帝時，後元年，立子惠爲高帝後。

本題之答

卷之三

芳澤大輔

(四)

上卷

昭和十六年十一月廿三日前後 河内省

十一月廿三日前後河內省  
十一月廿六日前後本省著者 (日語) (韓文)

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J. R. S. Doc. No. 1532

Item 163

(2)  $\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)$

七

## EXHIBIT NO.

I.P.S. Doc. No. 1532  
(9th, 192)

卷首課文	註	註	註
45577	註	註	註
電送第 45576 號	註	註	註
昭和 11 年 11 月 30 日	註	註	註
宛在館	註	註	註
行	註	註	註
八六號	註	註	註
大連	註	註	註
柳本	註	註	註
大使	註	註	註
索卿大臣	註	註	註
記載件	註	註	註
八六號 大連 柳本 (館長行書)	註	註	註

大臣 一、日本之滿洲事變同日開船半歲有余。而  
大臣 二、總理也亦莫同滿洲政府終始一貫。我國東北動，  
大臣 三、基調化三國條約。堅持日本國交調和。是厥空三  
大臣 三、今條約，滿國內事務，公事。滿洲事變。故然。能一  
大臣 三、度。次了滿洲。此。條約。所謂。目的。是。我國。參。滿  
大臣 三、事。別。是。我國。次。滿洲。事。  
大臣 三、六、從。日本。滿洲。事。通。我。中國。松威。行。三十。半  
大臣 三、嚴。難。解。之。合。以。基。解。於。從。未。文。津。津。  
大臣 三、續。也。次。文。津。之。難。東。掌。八。擴。兵。問。題。立。那。  
大臣 三、及。津。印。之。微。也。望。等。開。化。彼。我。見。解。  
大臣 三、對。立。未。之。合。之。也。未。文。津。之。津。津。之。微。之。根。下。  
大臣 三、難。開。之。首。口。半。則。于。國。警。國。外。處。理。究。其。  
大臣 三、傳。流。的。是。心。即。一。般。莫。不。首。上。會。談。表。之。半。  
大臣 三、合。標。方。則。的。標。之。固。朝。之。是。在。而。而。之。  
大臣 三、米。側。旨。卷。七。日。獨。行。欲。重。三。於。心。新。錄。序。道。之。

十一  
號電  
文

I.P.S. Doc. No. 1532  
(Item 192.)

即三國條約(日朝)于香港之總領事官之手書  
國伊頓被指掲示限日之定時同係一總領事官難  
為此地之總領事官指三國條約總領事  
事本不力，其人是不又。此事大消最後，  
段階至即最速改日同，折衝一休，明白上  
事。明二七八年八月三日開會於中國兩國政府，  
一月廿日的即太平洋行公使，平和總辦事  
在八國聯軍，三國條約總辦事，以予中國  
力不日歐洲總辦事人之公使，高麗國之于伊  
摶助，若皆接之以公使，云者七十七日於曉東。  
之于他，諸國應此用，中國人未便擅棄。

八月廿五日，提不力大將軍，為謀度，  
三、二十六日中國政府，提不力大將軍，為謀度，  
八月廿五日，提不力大將軍，為謀度，  
一月廿日的即太平洋行公使，平和總辦事  
在八國聯軍，三國條約總辦事，以予中國  
力不日歐洲總辦事人之公使，高麗國之于伊  
摶助，若皆接之以公使，云者七十七日於曉東。  
之于他，諸國應此用，中國人未便擅棄。

伊頓敵視於十八日(香港也)。

P. 2

/Marginal Remarks:/

Minister: O.K.

Vice-Minister:

/TOP SECRET/

#45577

Chief, Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs: /signed, illegible/

Chief, of the Telegraphic Section: NAMEYAMA /sealed/

----- X -----

Supervisor: YAMAMOTO /signed/

Drafted: November 28, 1941

Serial number of telegrams sent: #45576

Despatched: 3:30 p.m., Nov. 30, 1941

To: Ambassador OSHIMA in Germany

From: Minister TOGO

Cipher: No. 986 A; Very Urgent; Top Secret (Cipher code of Office Head)

Separate Telegram

1. The Japanese-American negotiations were commenced in the middle of April and they have been continued over a period of half a year. In the meanwhile, the Imperial Government, from the beginning to end has consistently stuck to the Tripartite Pact, which forms the unshakable keynote of our national policy, has been trying to bring out an amicable settlement as to the adjustment of Japanese-American relations strictly within the limits of the pact, and thus has endeavored to check America from participating into war, which fact is the desired end of the pact, by making negotiations with a constant resolute attitude.
2. Accordingly, the present cabinet, as previously telegraphed, strictly defending the Empire's prestige and existence, has carried on the past negotiations on a just and equitable basis. An opposition in views of both sides on the withdrawal of troops (the withdrawal of troops from China and French Indo-China is demanded) and on other matters could be mentioned as one of the chief difficult points, but the

fundamental difficulty, judging from the circumstances of past negotiations, lies rather in American adherence to her traditional idea regarding the management of international relations, namely - the adherence to the same fundamental idea shown in the British-American Conference held on the Ocean sometime ago. In short, the ultimate purpose of America is to deny and check the establishment of a new order (namely, the objective of the Tripartite Pact) in Europe and Asia by Japan, Germany, and Italy. That the maintenance of friendly relation between Japan and America would be difficult so long as the Empire acts in concert with Germany and Italy, was the stand America took, and based on this point of view, she began to assume the attitude to demand the Empire to break away from the Tripartite Pact. The above fact became clearer at the final phase of the negotiations, that is to say, during the negotiations of the last few days. As things have come to this, the Empire cannot but acknowledge that the continuance of further negotiation will be almost useless.

3. The counter-pronosition presented by the American Government on the 26th has made the above-mentioned attitude much clearer. As regards the "Tripartite Pact, it says: "Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power /or powers/ shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area," and so on. It is obvious that the above could be traced back to its attempt to withhold the Empire from supporting Germany and Italy when America participates into the European war some day, by confining the interpretation of the Empire's obligation under the Tripartite Pact. Putting aside the various other problems, from this paragraph alone I have judged that the American prorosition cannot be made the basis of the negotiations. Furthermore, before the American Government presented this prorosition, it had repeatedly consulted with Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, (China), etc. Therefore, it can be judged that together with those countries, America is now going to look upon the Empire as an enemy.

Superintendent: American Bureau Chief

Official in charge: 1st Section Chief, American Bureau (KASE)

Drafted on 1 Dec. 1941

Electrical Transmission No. 45682

Sent at 8:30 P.M., 1 Dec., 1941

To: Ambassador NOMURA in the United States

From: Minister TOGO

Subject: Japanese-American Negotiations

Code No. 865 (Diplomatic Agency Code) (Very secret)

/T.N. on the margin/ Minister (signature) Telegraph Section  
Vice-Minister Chi-f (KAMEYAMA)  
(Signature)

Re our preceding telegram No. 857

1. Though the date set by our preceding telegram No. 812 has passed and the situation is making more progress, yet with a view to taking precautions against unnecessarily increasing American misgivings we are giving the lead to the press and others saying that there is a wide gap between the claims of Japan and U.S.A., but that the negotiations are still going on. (The foregoing is only for Your Excellency's information.)
2. I shall refrain on this occasion from making the representations to the American Ambassador in Tokyo as mentioned at the end of your telegram No. 1124, and request you to make the representations at your end only.
3. A report says that the hasty return of the President to Washington may have been influenced by Premier TOGO's declaration of the 30th, but I have a feeling that it may have been because of his anxiety about the urgent situation in the Far East. I request you to investigate the actual facts.

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Item 204

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11/11/41

Vice Minister

Chief of the American Affairs Bureau

Chief of Telegraph Section (KAMEYAMA)

(Gen. 37537)

TO: Foreign Minister TOGO

FROM: Ambassador NOMURA

Dispatched: 3 Dec. 1941 PM, Washington

Received: 4 Dec. 1941 PM Foreign Office

(Secret - Ambassador Code)

Telegram No. 1256

(RUMORS REGARDING THE "REINFORCEMENT OF THE JAPANESE STATIONARY TROOPS" IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA)

Regarding your telegram No. 875

I received your reply immediately. I presume that this reply was, of course, carefully considered by the Cabinet Council (PYOKI?) However, as you have stated in your telegram, the United States is attaching a great deal of importance to this reply. Especially, since the President issued his statement yesterday, the press circle is frequently reporting that the reply to this matter under consideration is the key deciding war and peace between Japan and the United States.

There is no saying that the United States Government might not take a bold step, depending upon our reply. And, if our Imperial Government really anticipates the conclusion of the negotiations, or even in case your intention is to simply keep the negotiations going, I am afraid it would be difficult to convince the U.S.A. or prevent her from taking the bold step referred to with the explanation you have sent me. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. I, therefore, ask you to reconsider this question if possible with this in mind and wire me at once. (The end)



Jan. 22, 1952

監理者	監理者	監理者	監理者
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(2000 m a.s.l.)

Minister

Vice Minister

Chief of the Telegram Sec. (KAMEYAMA)  
Chief of the American Affairs Bureau (YAMAMOTO)  
Chief of 1st Sec. American Affairs Bureau (KASE)

Drafted: Dec. 7, 1941

Despatched on Dec. 7, 1941, 5:30 P.M.

To: Ambassador NOMURA in the U.S.A.

From: /Foreign/ Minister TOGO

Subject: Japanese-American negotiations  
(Presentation of Memorandum)

(Cipher) Very Urgent #007 (Ambassador's Code)

Re Outgoing telegram #001.

The Memorandum to the U.S.A. should be handed directly to the American Government (as far as possible, to the Secretary of State) by yourself at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th your time.

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Doc. 1532 B

大臣 次官 (總 36273)

亞米利加局貿易  
南洋局貿易

東洋外務大臣  
第一八號 (極神)

芳決大使

極神 謹啟

昭和六年十一月五日 德阿內食  
上月廿六日奉有承

(械)

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ニ基シ順次備達、事業第二着手平スヘキコト勿論在カ  
若シ交渉不調キル場合ニハ敵軍大隊作戰準  
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中ニ進軍ヲ見ルコトナルヘク其ノ場合後來、方針  
ニ從ヒ事件スヘキ事業第一、ノログラムモ大分變  
更ヲ要スルコトナリ作戰ニ即席ニ施設ノ  
至文部ヲ送ルコトナリヘクノルニ當方トシ

Doc. 1532B

現在、儘上テ軍事行動勦ラ進ミル政府乃至太本  
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ラス早ニ及シテ西安ナル准備ノ爲シ置度、詔  
テ八日朱文尚、後展並ニ前起、見秀ニ付仰  
意見アリ、至急シ電示形相談度シ  
追而檢察官御見、西安アリ、申入迄已無キコト乍ラ  
新南報ニ依レハ軍府ニテ米八莫諺蘭乃至  
支那側ト討旅ヲ爲シ度、日宋文尚、内容ハ  
之等諺汝府、承認シ方ナリ、三十天當地  
軍側已我方御訓令、内容乃至ハ文尚、經  
緯モ東京ト、往復等、方法ニ依リ承知  
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Doc. No. 1532 F

*More*

Item 163

To: Foreign Minister TOGO  
From: Ambassador YOSHIZAWA

Dispatched: 25 November 1941 P M HANOI  
Received: 26 November 1941 A M Foreign Office  
Secret Ambassador Code  
Telegram No. 118 (Secret)

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt a decision between peace and war will be made at the Imperial Conference within the next day or two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have already been laid down.

However, should the negotiations fail, since practically all preparations for the campaign are nearing completion, our forces shall be able to advance within ten days.

Under these circumstances, there shall have to be some alteration in the program we have laid out for the various enterprises. We shall have to establish organs and conduct negotiations in compliance with the campaign. The thing that we are most concerned about is whether it is the policy of the government or the Imperial Headquarters, in the event of war, to proceed with military operations and at the same time maintain the status quo of the French Indo-China governmental set-up. It is not only essential that we be advised of this, but we wish to make necessary pre-arrangements as early as possible.

If you have any opinions as to the development of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations and as to the outlook of the aforementioned matter, please inform this office as soon as possible.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance but according to press reports, the United States conferred with the representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands, and China in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Moreover, by means of personnel commuting to and from Tokyo, the military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but the general development of the said negotiations.

We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of the picture and neglected. As you pointed out in your circular message No. 2353, the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Therefore, please make arrangements to advise us immediately on these points by means of cable or courier services. (End)

Doc 1532 C<sup>on3</sup>,

(總 33752)

電信課長

總

昭和十六年十一月五日後 華府發

十一月六日前 本省著

(稿)

極秘 電信課長

野村大使

東御 外務大臣

次官 第一〇三六號

亞利加局長

貴電第七二五號 二關心

甲乙兩案未英譯文、勿論當方ニ於テモ早速  
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之出來次第至急御電報請ノ

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